I. INTRODUCTION
The phenomenon of the decreased fertility rate in the past century has led many people to worry about the future tax burden. As the increased child rearing cost is one of the major reasons for decline in fertility, many countries started providing child subsidies (child allowances) to raise the incentive of having children. Based on an individual-level panel dataset for all married Israeli women from 1999-2005, the empirical study of Ref. 1 shows that child subsidies can cause a significant positive effect on fertility. Other empirical studies examine the relationship between child allowances and fertility can be found in Refs. 8 and 6. In this paper, we develop an overlapping generations (OLGs) model with population growth and child allowances. Government levies income tax in order to provide child allowances. Based on the previous empirical studies, we adopt a fertility function which exhibits a positive relationship between child allowances and fertility. Theoretical studies generating a positive relationship between child allowances and fertility can be found in Refs. 10-12. In particular, there is a threshold effect of the marginal effect of child allowances on fertility. If the amount of child allowances is higher (lower) than the threshold, there will be a diminishing (increasing) marginal effect of child allowances on fertility.
We find that the effectiveness and the amount of child allowances are two important determinants to the monotonicity of the dynamics of the economy and the stability property of the non-trivial steady state. The provision of child allowances will cause two negative effects on capital accumulation. First, the tax rate reduces the after-tax income for the young and this will reduce savings and capital accumulation. Second, fertility is raised by the provision of child allowances and this will in turn raise population growth rate and reduce capital per worker in the future. The second effect is reinforced if child allowances have strong effects on fertility. We show that if the effectiveness of child allowances is large enough, an intermediate-sized tax rate will be enough to generate chaotic dynamics.
Because the formation of expectation is an important issue in an OLG model with capital accumulation, we then extend our model by considering a constant inter-temporal elasticity of substitution (CES) utility function to examine how expectation affects inter-temporal decisions and dynamics of capital accumulation. Under a CES utility function, the saving function depends on the future interest rate and we find that besides the effectiveness and amount of the child allowances, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption is also an important factor in determining the dynamic behavior of the economy. A decrease in the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution in consumption provides for the stability of the economy. If the positive effect on stability caused by a lower inter-temporal elasticity of substitution is smaller than the negative effect on stability caused by the provision of child allowances, the dynamics of capital per worker will become non-monotonic and the complex dynamics may emerge. In both settings of the utility function, besides illustrating the dynamic property by numerical examples, we also prove the existence and uniqueness of the non-trivial equilibrium and give conditions for the (non-) monotonicity of dynamics of capital per worker. Furthermore, we also provide conditions for the occurrence of Li-Yorke chaos and the bubbling phenomenon. Therefore, this paper contributes to the existing literature of fertility by showing that the provision of child allowances may cause chaotic dynamic behavior. Author to whom correspondence should be addressed. Electronic mail: mcli@math.nctu.edu.tw.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II develops an OLG model with child allowances. A logarithmic utility function is considered in this section. The stability property of the equilibrium and the monotonicity property of the dynamics are examined in Sec. III. A model with a CES utility function is developed and its dynamic behavior is analyzed in Sec. IV. Concluding remarks are given in Sec. V.
II. THE MODEL
We consider an infinite-horizon, discrete time OLG model. Agents live for three periods, corresponding to children, young agents, and old agents. Each period equals 30 years. Each agent is endowed with one unit of time in each period. Young agents use all the time for work to earn the real wage rates (w t ) for consumptions (c 1;t ) and savings (s t ). When young agents become old, they spend all the time for leisure and consume (c 2;tþ1 ) their savings from the previous period. We consider a separable utility function as follows:
where b 2 ð0; 1Þ is the discount factor. Government levies income tax with the rate of s 2 ð0; 1Þ. The budget constraints for young and old agents are
where R tþ1 represents the gross real return of capital in period t þ 1. We first consider a logarithmic utility function: Under the specification of the logarithmic utility function, the optimal saving decision given by the young agents is independent of the real interest rate; that is,
Young agents give birth to children. Government uses the tax revenue to provide child allowances and runs a balanced budget. Since the child allowance scheme reduces the cost of raising children, it raises fertility (and therefore population growth). Thus, we assume that fertility depends on the total amount of child allowances ðT t Þ received by each young individual. A fertility function which is positive dependent of child allowances is also adopted by Ref. 13 . With a balanced government budget constraint, that means T t ¼ sw t . In particular, we assume that the relationship between fertility and child allowances is characterized by a non-decreasing and bounded function,
where d; / > 0; 0 a 0 < a 1 ; nð0Þ ¼ a 0 ; lim w!1 nðw t Þ ¼ a 1 ;
The parameter a 0 represents the fertility rate when there is no child allowance scheme and a 1 is the saturating value of fertility. Hence, ða 1 À a 0 Þ is the maximum increase in fertility with the implementation of the child allowance scheme. When s ¼ 0 (no child allowance scheme), our model is reduced to the traditional growth OLG model with an exogenous population growth factor of a 0 . Parameters d and / measure the effectiveness of child allowances. If / 1, there will be a diminishing marginal effect of child allowances on fertility and nðT t Þ is concave. However, if / > 1, there will exist a threshold of the amount of child allowances, T, on the marginal effect of child allowances on fertility. When child allowances are smaller than T, similar to results obtained in the studies which endogenize fertility choice, the marginal effect of child allowances is increasing with an increase in the child allowances. But when the child allowances are higher than T , there is diminishing marginal effect of child allowances. That is, the function nðT t Þ is S-shaped when / > 1. Eq. (5) formation is used by Ref. 14 to represent the relationship between the survival probability to old age and the level of human capital to study the impact of longevity on economic growth. Eq. (5) formation is also used by Ref. 5 to represent the relationship between the efficient labor of old age and public health spending to examine the possibility of complex dynamics in an OLG model. It examines the effect of the dramatic increase in child allowances of the Israel Defense Forces for the third and higher birth-order children on fertility and finds that the fertility of Bedouin and Muslims is not affected by the increase of child allowances in Ref. 15 . In the following, we will examine the impact of / and focus our analysis on the case of / > 1.
Let L t denote the number of young agents in period t. The dynamics of population of generations is therefore governed by L tþ1 ¼ L t n t . Output ðY t Þ is produced by using capital ðK t Þ and labor through a Cobb-Douglas function:
, where A > 0 and a 2 ð0; 1Þ, respectively, represent the total factor productivity and capital share. Thus, the output per worker ðy t Þ can be written as
where k t is capital per worker in period t. It follows that the factor prices are
III. EQUILIBRIUM Combining Eqs. (5) and (6) and government budget constraint, the fertility can be represented as a function of capital per worker,
The capital market clearing condition implies that K tþ1 ¼ L t s t . Using Eqs. (4), (6), and (8), the capital market clearing condition can be represented by
Therefore, given the initial condition k 0 , the equilibrium is composed by the sequence fk t g t!0 that satisfies
where nðk t Þ is given by Eq. (8). Substituting Eq. (8) into Eq. (9), the dynamics of capital per worker can be represented as the following difference equation:
where
A. Dynamics
Steady states of dynamics Eq. (10) are determined by k tþ1 ¼ k t . There exists a zero (trivial) equilibrium of dynamics Eq. (10) and this zero equilibrium is unstable since (11) Proof. For k > 0, define hðkÞ ¼ k 1Àa and
Then the steady states are solutions of . ٗ
In the first part of the following theorem, we provide three sufficient conditions so that g 1 ðk t Þ is monotonically increasing in k t . In addition, although we are not able to get the closed-form solution of k Ã , we show that under these three conditions, the non-trivial steady state k Ã is a global attractor. In the second part of the Theorem 1, we give a sufficient condition in which g 1 ðk t Þ is not monotonically increasing in k t . We are more interested in the second case because the nonmonotonicity of g 1 ðk t Þ may generate endogenous cycles. Theorem 1. For the dynamics k t 7 !k tþ1 in Eq. (10), we have the following properties.
1. The unique positive steady state ðk Ã Þ is globally attracting and g 1 ðk t Þ is monotonically increasing in k t if one of the followings holds:
, and / is sufficiently large.
The law of the motion of k t is non-monotonic if
and / is sufficiently large.
Proof. Let k Ã denote the unique positive fixed point of g 1 ðkÞ. Differentiating g 1 ðkÞ with respect to k gives us,
Since lim k!0 g
By considering a new variable x ¼ dðsBk a Þ / , the numerator of g 
Then ½að1 À sÞF 2 D is the determinant for the existence of critical points of g 1 . Solving the equation 
Moreover 
À Á1
a ; indeed,
. From Proposition 1, we have either Then,
Thus, if / is sufficiently large, then k
ÀkÞ=2. Then > 0. By the definitions ofk and g 1 ðkÞ, we get that g 1 ðkÞ is a constant for all /. Moreover, if / is sufficiently large, then g 1 ðkÞ will be close to ð1ÀsÞFk a D for all 0 < k <k À and g 1 ðkÞ will be close to
for all k À k k , or both. By the intermediate value theorem applied to the function g 1 ðkÞ À k, there is a fixed point of g 1 ðkÞ in ½k À ;k þ , which must be k Ã due to Proposition
and g 0 ðk Ã Þ < 0. Therefore, g 1 ðkÞ is not monotonically increasing in k. ٗ Theorem 1 indicates that the monotonicity of g 1 ðk t Þ and the stability of the non-trivial steady state ðk Ã Þ depend on the effectiveness of child allowances ð/Þ and the amount of child allowances, measured by the tax rate ðsÞ. Note that Eq. (11) indicates that g 1 ðk t Þ will be monotonically increasing in k t if / 1. Because / > 1, the three conditions given in the first part of Theorem 1 which guarantee the monotonicity of g 1 ðk t Þ include the case of / 1. Based on Theorem 1, if the effectiveness of child allowances is lower than the critical value, ð /Þ; g 1 ðk t Þ will be monotonic and k Ã will be a global attractor. When the effectiveness of child allowances is higher than /; g 1 ðk t Þ is monotonic, provided that the tax rate is sufficiently low or high. If the effectiveness of child allowances is sufficiently high, we can relax the strict requirement of tax rate for the monotonicity of g 1 ðk t Þ and only require the tax rate to not lie in a certain range.
The second part of Theorem 1 indicates that g 1 ðk t Þ will become non-monotonic if the effectiveness of child allowances is sufficiently high and the tax rate is within a certain range. We illustrate the impact of the tax rate on the shape of the dynamics Eq. (10) 30 . For parameters used in the fertility function, we assign a 0 ¼ 1 to represent an extreme case that there is no population growth and a 1 ¼ 25 to represent the maximal women's reproductive period. We set d ¼ 1 and / ¼ 25, a sufficiently high value to generate the non-monotonicity of the dynamics Eq. (10). We refer this parameterization as our baseline model. The graphs of g 1 ðk t Þ with s ¼ 0:1; 0:25, and 0.35 are presented in Figure  1 . It shows that an increase in the tax rate depresses the locus of g 1 ðk t Þ toward the origin and lowers the non-trivial steady state k Ã . This is because the tax rate will cause two negative effects on the accumulation of capital. First, the higher tax rate reduces savings since the after-tax income for the young becomes lower. The lower saving will decrease the accumulation of capital (the saving effect). Second, the provision of child allowances raises fertility and this will in turn, ceteris paribus, reduces the capital per worker in the future (the capital-dilution effect). The effectiveness of child allowances ð/Þ strengthens the second effect. As shown in Figure 1 , g 1 ðk t Þ is monotonically increasing in k t when s is small ðs ¼ 0:1Þ; however, g 1 ðk t Þ becomes non-monotonic when s becomes larger (s ¼ 0:25 and 0.35).
B. Chaotic motion
The non-monotonicity of the dynamics of k t may behave in a way that the dynamics Eq. (10) becomes downwardsloping before the non-trivial steady state is achieved. This will cause some interesting dynamics behavior, such as regular cycles and chaos. Figure 1 also shows that as the tax rate changes from 0.25 to 0.35, the slope of the tangent line at k Ã becomes steeper. Using the parameterization used in Figure  1 , Figure 2 presents a bifurcation diagram of which s lies between 0 and 1. As shown in Figure 2 , when the tax rate is low, there is simple dynamics, such as a unique steady state or regular cycles. For a sufficiently low s ðs < 0:26Þ, there is a unique limit point which is a stable steady state. As the tax rate continues rising, a period-doubling bifurcation starts emerging and the economy gets into the region of chaotic dynamics when the tax rate is at the intermediate size (0:31 < s < 0:43). After that, a period-doubling bifurcation occurs again, followed by period-two cycles for a wide range of the tax rate (0:515 < s < 0:79). That is, the economy undergoes from simple dynamics to chaotic dynamics and then returns to simple dynamics. Note that the similar qualitative dynamic property will appear again as the tax rate continues rising. The chaotic dynamics will emerge when the tax rate is between 0.85 and 0.94 and the economy will get into the region of simple dynamics when the tax rate is higher than 0.94. Figure 2 numerically illustrates the occurrence of chaotic dynamics in our model. We are now in the position to prove the occurrence of chaotic motion. Before doing this, we define the Li-Yorke chaos which is based on the definition given by Ref. 2. The Li-York chaos is the mostly often used definition of chaos in the one-dimensional dynamical system due to its easy verification. Also refer to Refs. 3 and 6 for more applications of the Li-Yorke chaos in economic issues. Definition 1. Let H : I ! I be a function, where I is an interval. We say that H has Li-Yorke chaos on I if
1. H has periodic points of all periods; here by a periodic point p of period t, we mean that H t ðpÞ ¼ p and H i ðpÞ 6 ¼ p for 0 < i < t; 2. there exists an uncountable set S & I such that 
and
then for all sufficiently large /, the dynamics Eq. (10) will exhibit Li-Yorke chaos.
Notice that the right hand side of Eq. (12) (resp. (13)) dose not involve a 0 (resp. a 1 ).
Proof. In order to emphasize changes of the parameter /, let us re-denote the function g 1 in Eq. (10) by g 1;/ , that is,
Define g 1;1 to be a function given by the following: for k > 0,
Then, restricted to the interval ð0; k co Þ, the limit function of g 1;/ is g 1;1 as / goes to 1. By applying the Li-Yorke theorem, the dynamics of Eq. (10) exhibits chaos in the sense of Li and Yorke. ٗ Theorem 2 provides a sufficient condition for the Li-Yorke chaos under our model setting. Figure 2 shows that the economy makes the transition from simple dynamics to chaotic dynamics, then returns to simple dynamics (bubbling phenomenon) as the tax rate increases. Combining the result of 1(b) in Theorem 1 and the above theorem implies the following result regarding the bubbling phenomenon.
Corollary 1. Let a 0 and a 1 satisfy Eqs. (12) and (13) . Then for each large /, the dynamics Eq. (10) exhibits the bubbling phenomenon as s increases from 0 to 1.
Note that with the specification of the logarithmic utility function, the dynamic behavior of the economy does not depend on the agents' expectation since the saving function (4) is independent of the future interest rate. Therefore, in Sec. IV, we allow the expectation to affect the current saving decision by considering a CES utility function and examine how this change affects the dynamic behavior of the economy.
IV. A CES UTILITY FUNCTION
In this section, we consider a CES utility function as
1Àr , where r > 0 and r 6 ¼ 1 is the inverse of the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution of consumptions. When r ¼ 1, the utility function is defined as the logarithmic utility function in Eq. (1) . Under a CES utility function, the optimal saving decision becomes
Note that with r 6 ¼ 1, the saving function in period t depends on the real interest rate in period t þ 1 (R tþ1 ).
The law of motion of capital per worker becomes
Substituting Eqs. (6)- (8) into Eq. (15), the dynamics of capital per worker can be written as
Although we cannot explicitly express k tþ1 in terms of k t from Eq. (16), we can express their relationship by an implicit function g r . First, for each r > 0, we define F r : ð0; 1Þ Â ð0; 1Þ ! R by
Then for all 0 < k t ; k tþ1 < 1, we have F r that is continuously differentiable and
Thus, for each k t > 0, the function k tþ1 7 !F r ðk t ; k tþ1 Þ is continuous on ð0; 1Þ and attains values between À½ð1 À sÞBk a t ½1 þ dðsBk a t Þ / and 1 exactly once for k tþ1 in ð0; 1Þ. Hence, by the intermediate value theorem, there exists a unique point in ð0; 1Þ, namely k tþ1 ¼ g r ðk t Þ, such that F r ðk t ; g r ðk t ÞÞ ¼ 0. So far, we have obtained that g r forms a function from ð0; 1Þ into itself such that that the slope of the tangent line at k Ã r becomes less steeper as r increases from 1 to 8. Therefore, besides the amount and the effectiveness of child allowances, the dynamic property of the function g r ðk t Þ also depends on the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution. If the negative effects on the stability caused by an increase in s outweigh the positive effect on the stability induced by an increase in r, cycles and complex dynamics will emerge. Figure 4 displays a bifurcation diagram with varying values of s between 0 and 1 and r ¼ 3. Following Ref. 5 , we use the parametric interval of the tax rate for which there exists a unique stable positive steady state to evaluate the stability of the economy. It is clear that a rise in r increases the stability of the economy by comparing Figure 4 with Figure 2 . When r ¼ 3, the economy is unstable (not converging to the unique stable positive steady state) for 0:3 < s < 0:69 while under r ¼ 1, the economy is unstable for 0:26 < s < 0:94. Although a higher value of r will work for stability, period-doubling bifurcation, and chaotic motion will still occur if the tax rate is high enough, as shown by Figure 4 .
In the following theorem, we provide the condition for the occurrence of Li-Yorke chaos.
Theorem 3. Let a 0 and a 1 satisfy Eq. (12) and (13) . If / is sufficiently large and r is sufficiently close to 1, the law of motion in Eq. (16) exhibits Li-Yorke chaos.
Proof. From the proof of Theorem 3, let / be sufficiently large so that there exists p such that g 3 1 ðpÞ < p < g 1 ðpÞ < g 2 1 ðpÞ. Since g r ðkÞ is continuous as a function of jointly r and k, for all r close enough to 1 and all q close enough to p, one has g 3 r ðqÞ < q < g r ðqÞ < g 2 r ðqÞ. By the LiYorke theorem, the dynamics of Eq. (16) exhibits Li-Yorke chaos.
ٗ Theorem 3 provides a sufficient condition for the emergence of Li-Yorke chaos in the economy with a CES utility function. In fact, it shows that chaotic motion of the dynamical system under a CES utility function is inherited from the chaotic behavior of the dynamical system under a logarithmic utility function. Similar to the case of r ¼ 1, Figure 4 also indicates that the dynamics of Eq. (16) exhibits the bubbling phenomenon. Together with Proposition 2, the above theorem implies the following corollary.
Corollary 2. Let a 0 and a 1 satisfy Eqs. (12) and (13) . If / is sufficiently large and r is close enough to 1, the dynamics of Eq. (16) exhibits the bubbling phenomenon when s increases from 0 to 1.
Finally, in Figure 5 , we present a bifurcation diagram for varying values of r between 1 and 5 and s ¼ 0:35. It shows that chaotic dynamics will appear when r is sufficiently low. Studies of Refs. 6 and 7 have shown that under perfect foresight, a standard OLG model with a CES utility function will only generate simple dynamics and the nontrivial steady state is stable. Therefore, our results indicate that a fiscal policy like the child allowances scheme can generate chaotic dynamics and bubbling phenomenon in a model where it is generally prohibited. When r is high enough, chaotic motion will disappear and the period-doubling phenomenon will occur. An increase in r prevents the occurrence of chaotic dynamics because of its positive effect on stability. Chaotic motion will disappear if the positive effect on stability caused by an increase in r overrides the negative effects on stability caused by the implementation of the child allowance scheme.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we develop an OLG model with population growth to study the impact of child allowances on the economic dynamics. Our analysis shows that the amount and the effectiveness of child allowances as well as the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution are crucial factors in determining the dynamic property. The dynamics of capital per worker is simple if the effectiveness of child allowances on fertility is fairly small. However, cycles and even chaotic dynamics will occur if the effectiveness of child allowances is large enough and the tax rate is intermediate-sized. A decrease in the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution will prevent the economy from exposing to irregular fluctuations. Since our analysis indicates that the dynamic property depends on how child allowances affect fertility, a more precise empirical estimation of the effectiveness of child allowances is worthy of future study.
